Friday, March 07, 2008
A Rose is a Rose is a Rose
In order to keep from discussing the Obama campaign's methods here—the Hilzoy/De Long axis keeps trying to tell us they are pure, and the commenters here appear to agree; why let matters of fact* get in the way?
So let's look a little more at the gambling activities of one Peter Edward Rose.**
The simplest way to answer the question most recently posted is to look at his cumulative returns. While we know the ultimate answer must be significantly negative, the accumulation is frightening in its consistency***:
After April 11th, Rose doesn't even approach break-even. There is a brief "winning streak" from the 15th to the 18th, and a fairly solid positive trend in American League bets from 15 April to 4 May (14 nonnegative days in 17 days of bets), but the time from May 5th to the 12th produces $30,000 in losses (three days—May 6, 8, and 9—lose $26,000, almost all of which is due to bad AL bets that more than negate the net $21,000 gain of the AL streak).
On the surface, on balance, and with few exceptions, the only obvious trend in the data Coate presents on Rose's betting is that he fails to consider the primary rule of betting: if you can't find the sucker at the table, the odds are good it is you.
*Link added here, as it was deleted at the original discussion, though a peculiar manifestation of The Obama Rules remains in response to it.
**Again, all data from Coate (2008), available in PDF form here. Dollar amounts do not foot for the National League; presumably this is an error of mine.
***All of the following data excludes the Cincinnati games, since we are working on the presumption, supported by the evidence presented, that Rose would not have bet against the Reds. The overall effect upon the data of adding those games does not appear as if it would be significant.
Labels: baseball, efficient markets, Rutgers
