Marginal Utility

by Tom Bozzo

This morning was a test of how many times I could hear the word "pause" used on NPR, without someone translating the usage into standard English, without going (more) insane. The answer is a lot, but not so much as to make it safe for me to listen to Morning Edition all the way through.

Let's just all say it: a "pause" in the draw-down from the "surge" means that the "surge" is a "(quasi-)permanent escalation."

Labels: Iraq

by Tom Bozzo

Spencer Ackerman:

I recommend a two-pronged strategy. First, begin drinking heavily. Second, withdraw immediately from Iraq.

...via DeLong, who adds:

I still haven't wrapped my mind around the fact that we are providing air support to a group called "The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution [in Iraq]"

(Though Wikipedia says that they now prefer "Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council.")

Labels: Iraq

by Ken Houghton

In the Christian Science Monitor's piece today, "How will the Iraq war end?"* comes the most peculiar comment:

At least one US ally in the region remains grateful he is gone.

"Any Iraq will be better than Iraq under Saddam, because the Iraq of Saddam had the ability to threaten Israel," says Shlomo Brom, a senior fellow at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies and former head of the Israeli Defense Force's Strategic Planning Division.

Besides the revelation that we have more than one ally in the region, I was amazed to discover that Iraq was a direct threat to Israel. Indeed, the Holt, Rinehart, Winston world atlas confirms that "the ability to threaten Israel" would depend on going through Syria and/or Jordan.

The piece ends with this cheery thought:

Taking all these factors into account, success in Iraq at this point might be defined as a unified country that does not offer sanctuary to Islamic militants and is governed by a stable regime that is not under the influence of a hostile foreign power, such as Iran.

That, for example, is the bottom line of Andrew Krepinevich, a veteran Army planner and now president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Reaching this relatively stable state could take another three to five years – if it can be reached at all. Even then, the US might need to keep a substantial number of troops in the country – to keep Iraq's internal factions from going after one another and to protect the nation from its external enemies.

"A reasonable outcome would find something like 30,000 to 40,000 troops in Iraq for 25 to 50 years," says Dr. Krepinevich in an e-mail.

After all, the US has deployed troops in Germany and Japan for 63 years, and Korea for 57. Might Iraq, in the end, require a commensurate commitment?

I'm certain the troops in those three states are constantly on alert status as well. But at least Dr. Krepinevich is more optimistic than John McCain.

*Didn't it end on May 1st of 2003, with the "Mission Accomplished"/"I don't know how to wear a flight suit" speech? I'm so confused...

Labels: Iraq, Israel, Politics

by Ken Houghton

Ignoring that our luggage was lost and my IRS interview tonight may have to be done in tennis shoes and two-days-worn clothing...

1. Ed Glaeser (having presented what seems to have been a fascinating paper) responding to the question "Why didn't you include the current Iraq war in your discussion?" by noting that he stopped with Vietnam because "we have the LBJ tapes as evidence." And noting the point to which many of us return: It's possible that this entire cf is because GWB believes Saddam Hussein really did try to kill his father.
   
   
2. Dani Rodrik (following a presentation by William Easterly) by declaring that his presentation should be though of as "Easterly on Prozac"—and then proving it by attempting to embed YouTube clips into his presentation.*

More on the Rodrik presentation later.


He was sadly unsuccessful. I encourage everyone to go over to his blog and ask him to post the links. And while you're there, read this post, which dovetails nicely with that presentation. UPDATE: Dani Rodrik has posted those links, and summarized his presentation here.

UPDATE 2:Felix Salmon piles on, as it were, adding a clip via Infectious Greed to the mix.

Labels: Dani Rodrik, Economic Development, Economics, Iraq, PortfolioMarketMovers

by Tom Bozzo

John Quiggin is perhaps a bit too fair and balanced describing how legitimate libertarians might look back on the Bush administration's dazzling successes:

This process cuts both ways. It’s hard to witness the catastrophic government failure that has characterized every aspect of this war without becoming more sympathetic to certain kinds of libertarian (and also classically conservative) arguments, particularly those focusing on the fallibility of planning. [link omitted]

If Iraq is a lesson in the fallibility of planning, then the inability of my car to transform into a flying robot is a lesson in the failure of Toyota's engineering.

Meanwhile, our friend Stephen Karlson points to a Weekly Standard article suggesting businesslike incentives (read, privatization of airport management) could cure those annoying security lines. At Fair Harvard, Irwin "Condoleezza Rice's Charm Enhances Her Power" Stelzer learned:

If lines lengthen at security check points no one has an incentive to add staff, open more lanes, or do anything to relieve the passenger's plight. By contrast, such a situation at Whole Foods, Giant, or any respectable supermarket results in the opening of more check-out lines to relieve congestion. Store managers have an incentive to prevent customers from taking their business elsewhere; airport managers don't, or think they don't. Indeed, they have every incentive to keep costs down and profits up, even if that means providing a miserable service. Imagine what life would be like in an airport in which security personnel, or at least the managers, had their pay cut every time lines lengthened beyond some target limit, and the power to correct the situation.

How soon they forget! As recently as six years ago or so, airport security screening was almost totally privatized! Lines were short, so that in my former frequent-flying life, I could show up at 0700 for an 0720 departure from Madison's (still) relatively passenger-friendly airport. The cursory screening was pretty effective at what it was meant to do, which is to say keeping random nutballs from hijacking planes to Cuba. As for the non-random nutballs, well, that was another matter.

In any event, airports actually had been pushing for increases in TSA screeners — which had been capped by act of the late Republican Congress — and/or less time-consuming screening procedures. Amazing what you can learn via Teh Google.

(reference)

Labels: Iraq, Trains Planes and Automobiles, Wingnuttia

by Ken Houghton

Goes to Jon Swift, whose Aristotelian logic* is unimpeachable.


*A moron wrote the e-mails; Steve Boylan Is Not a Moron; therefore everyone who agrees that the computer is Boylan's and the style is Boylan's and therefore the e-mail was sent by Boylan—be they on the right, left, or center—must be wrong.

Labels: Iraq, Politics, SoftBigotryofLowExpectations

by Tom Bozzo

August-in-October hasn't been good for the blog. Sorry, all. Here are a few thoughts rattling around:

• There's nothing better than watching political suicide when it's the other side doing it. Angry Pregnant Lawyer has the perfect related post title: Kiss-my-assionate Conservatism.
• Good for David Obey for realizing that it's not a bad thing to stand in the way of the war funding bill. Can we just all say, together, $190 billion for the war(s) is fucking nuts?! That is, we'd spend in the sixth year more than what Larry Lindsey got sacked for saying the whole enterprise would cost (not counting blood). But Larry Lindsey is fat.
• In comparison, copies of Civ IV with expansion packs cost less than $100 and could occupy neocon idiots for an arbitrarily long time. Who says playing computer games at work can't be value-creating?
  
• What blockhead(s) approved the American Center, surely our area's least transit-oriented development?
• While headed out there for an allergist appointment, my car's odometer passed 6,000 miles. That was exactly 21 months after the delivery date. Do not, repeat do not, get an expensive-ish car for 300 miles of driving a month.
• Ironically, this car was less expensive than its predecessor, and indeed meant to be a baby step off the inclined treadmill up auto manufacturers' product lines as one's career advances. Memo to self: when detaching from the consumerist culture, be bolder.
  

Labels: Iraq, Random Bullets, Trains Planes and Automobiles

by Ken Houghton

A letter-writer to Altercation asks about the legendary "$20 a barrel oil will pay for the Iraq War and then some" claim.

Rupert Murdoch is best known for having said it in an interview published 12 Feb 2003:

They'd certainly want to establish a democratic regime as soon as possible and they'd want to get out as soon as they can. It's got to be a question of handing the assets of Iraq back to the people of Iraq under a responsible government as soon as possible. I'm sure that's the game plan; what the time frame is, I don't know. The greatest thing to come of this to the world economy, if you could put it that way, would be $US20 a barrel for oil. That's bigger than any tax cut in any country. [emphasis mine]

But places such as NRO had already made the argument at length (17 Jan 2003):

War with Iraq is now likely, and timing of the war points to the first quarter. The war should end quickly with minimal casualties.

Differences between today and 1991 suggest that oil prices are unlikely to match the highs seen in 1990 — but that the correction [he means downward] is apt to be as severe. Here are the variables:

Iraq is a less important supplier of oil today....

A quick military victory could remove a major uncertainty facing world oil supplies....Under U.S. military occupation, oil exports would be expected to hold steady, as opposed to Saddam’s use of oil as a political weapon....The U.S. military will oversee oil production operations to secure volumes near Iraq’s current capacity of 3 million barrels a day or more, versus production of 2 million barrels a day in 2002.

Even if war is averted, oil prices should fall this year. The “no-war” scenario would likely come about if Saddam Hussein’s government complies with UN sanctions and cooperates with UN weapons inspectors. This scenario assumes a steadier flow of oil from Iraq in 2003 of, say, 2.8 million barrels a day, or 800,000 more barrels a day than in 2002.

And higher production from Iraq would consume all, or more than all, of the increased call on OPEC oil projected for 2003, leaving no room for higher output by the other ten OPEC members — for the third year in a row — unless oil prices fall.* The persistent erosion in OPEC’s market share and need for revenues is apt to push members to cheat further on production quotas.

A drop in oil prices to a more normal level, of $18 to $20 barrels a day [? - I assume this is an editing error], would stimulate economic growth and likely would be beneficial to many industries, just as it was in 1991.** [emphases mine]

But beating up the NRO is rather pointless, especially as they had abundant company.

One of the earliest sources appears to be the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (26 November 2002):

many analysts believe that if America were to help a "pro-Western" Iraqi government to develop the country's oil resources, such a price spike would likely be followed by a sharp decline in oil prices (possibly to well under $20 a barrel). [emphasis mine]

Business Week at least cited a source, beating Murdoch by a full six weeks (30 Dec 2002):

The oil threat from an Iraqi war is less immediate but potentially more severe. Lehman Brothers Inc. global chief economist John Llewellyn in London figures there's a 70% chance that there will be no war or an easy war with Iraq, causing oil prices to fall to $20 a barrel. But he estimates that there is a 5% chance that the conflict could spread to other parts of the gulf, potentially driving oil prices to $75 a barrel or more. Impossible? He regards the $3 price increase resulting from Venezuela's troubles as a warning: "It shows what even a modest supply disruption can do in a tight market." [emphases mine--and I want to play poker with Mr. Llewellyn]

And, of course, despite being a late-comer to the party (31 March 2003), Money magazine piled-on with an article CNN headed with "Iraq has been on the sidelines of the oil world for 20 years. Soon it won't be.":

Indeed, while rebuilding Iraq's decrepit oil industry could cost the U.S. billions of dollars, that will be more than made up for by lower oil prices over the long term. For starters, $20-a-barrel oil would probably bring prices at the pump back down to about $1.35 a gallon, well below the current average of nearly $1.71. For a typical SUV driver, that's a savings of $228 a year.***

*Note the contrast between Iraq "leaving no room" and the "third year in a row" declaration--which would include 2002, when Iraqi production was 1MM bbl below capacity.

**The 1991 production gain notably came from restoring Kuwait, not destroying Iraq.

***How's that working out for SUV drivers? Oh, yeah.

Labels: Economic History, Energy, Iraq, Oil, Politics

by Ken Houghton

The Avon girls* were passing out St. Derek of Pasta Diving (tm - Scott L) new cologne, Driven,** so I had to visit LG&M Thursday.

Well worth the trip.*** It's nice to see that that messy "Iraq" thing has been solved and we can go back to important work:

[Senator Mitch McConnell]’s “deeply disappointed” the new Democratic-controlled Congress has not tackled the “tough issues,” like Social Security…

Besides their “preoccupation” with the Iraq war, Democrats spend their time dreaming of “taxation, regulation and litigation. It’s in their DNA.”

It's a good thing, as I noted Wednesday, that Jane GaltMegan McArdle assures us that we can ignore anything a politician says; otherwise, I might start thinking that the Republicans are trying to distract us from the war and pay for their exorbitant spending with the Greenspan Committee's payroll tax increase that both (1) was scheduled to pay the Boomer retirements and (2) even now was rather accurate in its demographic projections, and moderately pessimistic about productivity and revenue gains.

Headline Reference should be clear to EOB readers. See here for album picture.


*Phrase used advisedly. While at my age anyone Suzanne's age or younger can fairly be considered a "young woman," these two appeared barely old enough to carry a Trapper-Keeper.

**The cologne was named, one guesses, because it is the answer (along with "He was...") to "How did Derek Jeter get to a ball hit four steps to his right?"

***I have to assume that this

Given rural Kentuckans' well known hatred for Federal entitlement programs, dismantling Social Security is a sure winner for Mitch, but it's still kind of surprising to see a Republican in a border state try to shift the focus from the war to domestic issues...

is a joke (possibly unintentional), since without those Federal entitlement payments, the state of Kentucky would be at least $500MM a year poorer [PDF]. If we assume they are rational, then cutting SocSec and Medicare payments should be the last thing on a Kentuckian's mind.

Labels: baseball, Eat Our Brains, Iraq, LGandM, policy wonk, Politics, social security

by Tom Bozzo

Thinking of EconoSpeak, Barkley Rosser has a post up that suggests that while oil was a contributing factor in the decision to wage the Iraq war — most notably insofar as it was set up by Gulf War I — there are other causes to consider. But this arguably misses a common thread to the other factors, that none of them point inelutctably to war in Iraq in the absence of the oil cause:

• The rabidly pro-Israel neocons. It stands to reason that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union might still have offered support to Israel's adversaries solely to counterbalance U.S. influence. But insofar as Saddam Hussein's grander ambitions were relatively expensive, it's hard to see a counterfactual oil-poor Iraq posing an "existential threat" to Israel.
  
• Fat-defense-budget conservatives. Does this gang really need a war to justify Cold War-level military spending? If anything, the sort of boring expenditures needed to support the war take money away from sexy big-ticket items like supersonic jets and big surface combatants. Nor would Iraq have been an obvious target for Rumsfeld's war-on-the-cheap experiment in the absence of the oil-driven Gulf War I. The Reagan-H.W. Bush [*] adventures in blowing stuff up focused on targets unlikely to lead to quagmires.
  
• The Deciderator's own contribution. Part of this, Rosser suggests, was to paper over the incipient strategic failure in Afghanistan and political weakness on domestic issues, but the war in Afghanistan wouldn't have happened without 9/11, and 9/11 might not have been 9/11 without Gulf War I and the heightened U.S. military and political involvement in the Middle East due to the strategic importance of the region's oil reserves. Likewise, arguments from the don't-do-as-daddy-did direction run up against the petro-strategery causes of Gulf War I.

[*] Or, as my friends and I liked to call it, Operation Just 'Cause.

Labels: Iraq

by Tom Bozzo

Reported by David Corn in The Nation:

[Sen. John Warner] then asked Petraeus a pointed question: "Do you feel that [Iraq war] is making America safer"?

Petraeus paused before responding. He then said: "I believe this is indeed the best course of action to achieve our objectives in Iraq."

That was, of course, a non-answer. And Warner wasn't going to let the general dodge the bullet. He repeated the question: "Does the [Iraq war] make America safer?"

Petraeus replied, "I don't know, actually. I have not sat down and sorted in my own mind." [Emphasis added.]

Via Instaputz, where Blue Texan says, "Game over." Now to get Democratic Party "leaders" to figure that out...

Labels: Iraq

by Ken Houghton

See cactus at Angry Bear.

Volumes 6 (via Brad DeLong), 5, 4 (includes Mark Thoma), 3, 2, and 1.

Labels: Iraq, Tom Toles

by Tom Bozzo

We picked up a link a few days ago from an unlikely source, the Protein Wisdom Pub. In a post that, among other things, describes our quals based on the political content of the blogroll ("fairly left-leaning"), it's asserted that "statistics comparing 2006 with 2007" deployed by major figures of the left blogiverse such as Kevin Drum and Matthew of Large Media, "[tell] us nothing about the success of the new US counter-insurgency strategy" because the surge "did not have any implementation before mid-February." The preferred analysis claims a downward turn to the civilian casualty trend line (eyeballed or the equvalent from seasonally unadjusted and otherwise tweaked icasualties.org data) since the start of the surge, and does so by comparing data from this summer with the winter and/or spring.

Now, I'm no Jim Hamilton, but I can say with reasonable authority that the claim that year-over-year comparisons of data from Iraq are necessarily uninformative is all wet. Indeed, such comparisons are a simple way of eliminating some seasonal effects from data. With a simple model of data generation (e.g., the seasonal effects are additive), you can verify by simple algebra that a year-over-year difference will eliminate the seasonal factor [*], whereas intra-year comparisons and comparisons between different periods in different years will tend to confound seasonal and trend effects.

So, for the intrayear comparisons to be (relatively) valid as an indicator of trend reversal, it must be either that the seasonal effects are small, or that they just so happen to cancel out. Indeed, PW Pub's Karl argues that the effects are small, in part based on analysis at the econoblog Creative Destruction, which ran a seasonal adjustment model on the fatality data for the U.S. forces.

The results at Creative Destruction, which yield a seasonally adjusted 101 U.S. military deaths for July 2007 from the actual 79, aren't actually helpful to the trend reversal argument. Apart from a peak in May, seasonally adjusted casualties suggest a plateau at a rate of around 100 deaths/month for the surge through July (the analysis was posted on August 2), which is very high for any extended period. As I'd noted previously, while there's a lot of variation in the data, it's clear without any special quantitative analysis that the summer months are never the annual peak.

However, there is a bit more to the argument out of Wingnuttia that perhaps merits some additional discussion. It's suggested that year-over-year comparisons confound an effect of the surge with that of an increase in violence against civilians which is dated to the February '06 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, even though the real takeoff in the data (from icasualties.org) isn't until the fall of '06. The implication that civilian life in Iraq was just hunky-dory in 2004-2005 is questionable at best, though I wouldn't dispute a claim that the the SNAFU has acquired more CF since. [**]

The argument is that if you think things are bad now, imagine how much worse they'd be but for the surge. That's not exactly a narrative of triumph, considering the difficulty of maintaining the surge, let alone any further escalation of a magnitude that might be thought to be able to restore the status quo ante.

Worse still, the supposed reversion in the civilian fatality trend is, itself, showing signs of reverting in the bad direction. The count at icasualties.org, after dropping from 1,782 in May to 1,148 in June, increased sequentially in July and August — 1,458 and 1,598, respectively. The latter, in particular, is at the level of the civilian casualty peak or plateau (using data that are adjusted as described, in part, here) from the pre-surge months.

So, really, there's sod all to show for the surge. Coalition military fatalities are high, Iraqi civilian fatalities are high, and by many other metrics Iraq remains an unholy mess. All this at a cost to the U.S. taxpayer of several tens of billions of dollars at an annual rate. Who wouldn't want more surge? [/sarcasm]

The last thing is about the adjustments to the civilian casualty data, which remove a few peaks from the raw icasualties.org data. In one case, the adjustment is ostensibly justified, as it eliminates the effects of a temporary change in the count methodology [***]. In another, the rationale is, to say the least, curious. "Engram" deletes the 965 deaths in August of '05 from the Al-A'imma bridge stampede because:

Those tragic deaths were clearly an aberration and should not be included in a graph that tries to assess trends in the level of violence in Iraq.

The reported cause of the stampede was a rumor that a suicide bomber was amid the crowd, which had been subjected to mortar attacks earlier in the day. So this is hardly a non-terrorism-related incident, even if the spread of the rumor wasn't itself an act of terrorism. The irony is that Engram is a member of the Althousian 9/11-changed-everything set:

Pre-9/11, I was a politically incurious liberal, but my curiosity increased substantially -- and my views changed considerably -- after 9/11.

By the same logic, if you're trying to assess trends in the level of violence in the U.S., the tragic deaths of 9/11 are clearly an aberration. So what the hell are we doing there?


[*] This assumes the seasonal component enters additively in the current and previous-year data. More sophisticated seasonal adjustment approaches allow for situations such as seasonal effects that vary over time.

[**] The subsequent discussion ignores the significant obstacles to reliably measuring the consequences of the war for the civilian population; the icasualties.org data is an incomplete and unverified tabulation from news accounts

[***] For some purposes, it actually can be better to have data that are wrong in a consistent way.

Labels: Iraq, Statistics, Wingnuttia

by Tom Bozzo

From 9CA, OK'ing the use of high-powered sonar in planned naval training exercises off the California coast:

"The public does indeed have a very considerable interest in preserving our natural environment and especially relatively scarce whales," Judge Andrew Kleinfeld wrote for the majority. "But it also has an interest in national defense. We are currently engaged in war, in two countries."

Someday, one of the countries we're at war with might even have a navy.

Labels: Afghanistan, Iraq, Utter Stupidity

by Tom Bozzo

A wire service article on the front page of today's Wisconsin State Journal bears the headline, "Military has non-lethal gun it could use to pacify Iraqis." [*] The "gun" in question is the Active Denial System, a directed-energy weapon.

Lest you get too hopeful, what the device does is heat the skin with bursts of electromagnetic energy, "causing a feeling similar to being on fire," according to a handy graphic accompanying the story.

Because nothing says "pacification" like the sensation of being burned alive!

A colleague chuckling mordantly over the article in the lunchroom suggested that the military might get better pacification results using the Mobile Cannabis Fogger.


[*] For those of you who don't click through, that's apparently a local concoction; the headline at the link is "Pentagon nixes ray gun weapon."

Labels: Iraq, Star Wars

by Ken Houghton

But they're Serious:

The top American commander in Iraq is expected to tell Democrats in Congress part of what they want to hear next month when he briefs Washington on the status of the surge, namely that at some point American troop levels in Iraq will recede.

In September, when General David Petraeus will give classified and unclassified testimonies and recommendations to Congress, he will stress that unprecedented progress has been made against Al Qaeda and Iran's network in Iraq, lessening the need for the current troop levels of approximately 160,000. At the same time, the general will warn that any military progress made against America's foes will be lost if the surge ends precipitously.

So if Petraeus announces that the total troops will be cut to, say, 158,000, the Democrats win and can stop asking for a withdrawal plan, right?

Labels: Iraq

by Tom Bozzo

Robert Farley notes at LGM that the lower U.S. death toll in Iraq for July — 78 as of this morning, at icasualties.org — is being touted as the "year's lowest." Go surge?! In the NYT:

On July 26, Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the second-ranking American commander in Iraq, said that the lower death toll was a “positive sign” but that it was too early to say whether the reduction was a “true trend.”

Farley makes the needed 'one observation (probably) does not a trend make' comment, and raises the possibility of seasonality in the data. Here's a graph of the icasualties.org tallies by month (for the whole coalition, not just the U.S.):


A few observations on top of Farley's:

1. They forgot about Poland: The figure for total coalition casualties for the month (87) is a less-newsworthy fourth-best for the year.
2. So far, 2007 looks like 2006, shifted up.
   
3. The July fatality rate (2.81/day) remains above the 2.48/day average for the entire ordeal.
   
4. If someone's popping corks over 78 deaths a month, when the figure has been less than half that as recently as March 2006 (a long time ago, actually), then success clearly is being defined down.
   
5. The seasonality picture is a bit hard to eyeball (unlike, say, the pattern of natural gas usage at my house), though it's pretty uniformly the case that the summer months are never the annual peak. Taking past years as a guide, I'd bet on at least one month to come this year that's considerably worse than the summer trough.
   
6. Like Farley, I'd guess that the non-summer peaks aren't random, though I think it's a matter for future military historians more than X-12 ARIMA to describe the considerations behind the timing of the operational (and hence casualty) peaks.
   

Labels: Iraq, Statistics

by Ken Houghton

Via Economics Roundtable comes an article on using Henry V* to learn Leadership at Wharton. What caught my eye was this:

"To be a great leader, you have to understand people," said Carol Adelman, who led the session with her husband Ken, founders of Movers & Shakespeares. After distinguished careers in government service, they have conducted sessions on Shakespeare and leadership in diverse business, educational, and government organizations.

Hmmm. Ken Adelman. And he wants to teach the students what:

With little discussion, Henry makes his decision to go into battle.

But before this meeting, Henry astutely had aligned the interests of all the major players. For the nobles, the conquest of France offered access to rich resources and plunder. The clergy, by offering a religious justification for the invasion, gained the king's support to kill a pending bill in Parliament that would have taken half of church lands and imposed heavy fines. The king himself saw the French campaign as a chance to demonstrate his leadership, secure his hold on the English throne, and make his indelible mark on history. None of these issues is discussed during the meeting, but the work in building coalitions was done beforehand. The meeting is a formality that ensures that everyone has bought into the plan. "It can be a very costly mistake if you don't do this kind of consensus building," said Ken Adelman.

Sounds like a smart guy, a consensus builder. But where have we heard that name before? Oh, yeah. This piece from 13 February 2002:

Two knowledgeable Brookings Institution analysts, Philip H. Gordon and Michael E. O'Hanlon, concluded that the United States would "almost surely" need "at least 100,000 to 200,000" ground forces [op-ed, Dec. 26, 2001]. Worse: "Historical precedents from Panama to Somalia to the Arab-Israeli wars suggest that . . . the United States could lose thousands of troops in the process."

I agree that taking down Hussein would differ from taking down the Taliban. And no one favors "a casual march to war." This is serious business, to be treated seriously.
In fact, we took it seriously the last time such fear-mongering was heard from military analysts -- when we considered war against Iraq 11 years ago. Edward N. Luttwak cautioned on the eve of Desert Storm: "All those precision weapons and gadgets and gizmos and stealth fighters . . . are not going to make it possible to re-conquer Kuwait without many thousands of casualties." As it happened, our gizmos worked wonders. Luttwak's estimate of casualties was off by "many thousands," just as the current estimates are likely to be.

I believe demolishing Hussein's military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk. Let me give simple, responsible reasons: (1) It was a cakewalk last time; (2) they've become much weaker; (3) we've become much stronger; and (4) now we're playing for keeps. [empahsis mine]

And what was Agincourt?:

Henry V invaded France for several reasons. He hoped that by fighting a popular foreign war, he would strengthen his position at home. He wanted to improve his finances by gaining revenue-producing lands. He also wanted to take nobles prisoner either for ransom or to extort money from the French king in exchange for their return.

Yep, that's what Ken Adelman should be teaching students, all right.

*Yes, I know the title of this post is from Richard III. Bear with me.

Labels: Economics, education, Iraq, Politics

by Tom Bozzo

A wire service news-in-brief item in the Wisconsin State Journal tells me that U.S. and Iraqi officials are claiming a decline in Iraqi civilian casualties for June. U.S. military spokesperson Lt. Col. Christopher Garver says "a slight decrease in the month of June" represents the start of "a potential downward trend."

You might think that extrapolating a trend from one observation which, by whatever measurement standards have survived the administration's attempts to make the accurate recording of civilian deaths difficult (lest the last few the dead-enders supporting the war who might be affected by such things get too down), is part of a not publicly released series that is nevertheless characterized as not so great (see "slight decrease") represents some sort of grasping at straws for good news. I say, it's a sure sign that the administration now is totally off its P.R. game. [*]

If they had a public relations statistician on call worth his or her hourly consulting rate, they'd have been told that even a slight increase in the civilian death toll potentially could represent the start of a "downward trend" — only with a lower probability of representing an actual turning point than the seemingly peskier "facts." If they won't deploy every tool of statistical reasoning, how can they be expected to win. [**]


[*] To a considerable extent, the Bushies' reputation for good message control was little more than an artifact of the fecklessness of Democratic "strategists" and/or the supineness of the bulk of the Beltway cocktail-circuit press. What, after all, could have been in I. Lewis Libby's body cavities that the commutation of his prison sentence couldn't have waited for the Friday news graveyard. (For reaction to the Libby story, see Madison Guy, Digby, a roundup including major Democrats' statements from John Aravosis, TBogg, Hilzoy, Mark Thoma, and The Editors.)

[**] The Onion, National Treasure, Priceless: "Bush: Maybe U.S. Military 'Just Not Very Good.'"

Labels: Current Events, Iraq

by Ken Houghton

It's not Kevin Drum's fault. (Or Dr. Black's, for linking to him.) But I'm getting tired of seeing half of the story told, so let me lay out what's wrong with simply stating this:

There is, at this point, simply nothing more we can do in Iraq. The only sensible course of action is to leave. Completely.

It's not that it's incorrect; it's just incomplete. Watch the way the snake eats itself, Ragnarok-like:

1. The United States established permanent bases in Saudi Arabia
   
2. Several prominent Saudis took offence at that, among them members of the Bin Laden family
   
3. After "learning the ropes" with some (arguably limited) U.S. support in Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden worked to develop a network of operatives loyal to him, with one stated goal being to get the United States to remove its bases from Saudi Arabia.
   
4. Many of Mr. Bin Laden's followers were volunteers from Saudi Arabia; one may reasonably assume that his Vision Statement ("U.S. out of Saudi Arabia") was contributory to his ability to draw Saudi volunteers.
   
5. Fifteen (15) of those volunteers were on hijacked planes on 11 September 2001. None of those fifteen was an innocent bystander.
   
6. In the two years after 11 September 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan, withdrew its military personnel from Saudi Arabia, and invaded Iraq.
   
7. In the aftermath of the end of "major combat activities" on 1 May 2003, the United States is establishing permanent bases in Iraq.

Kevin states the conclusion, leaving the rest as an exercise to the reader. Let's tell the whole story.

Labels: history repeated, Iraq, sovereignty, terrorism